Contiant: The Bulgarian “Open Banking” Gateway Connecting Yapily to Illegal Offshore Casinos

Compliance Analysis Date: December 16, 2025

This report profiles Contiant Ltd, a Bulgaria-based payment processor that has emerged as a critical financial gateway for illegal offshore gambling operators. Our investigation confirms that Contiant acts as a “Technical Service Provider” (TSP), effectively piggybacking on the regulated open banking infrastructure of Yapily Connect UAB to process high-risk transaction volumes from prohibited jurisdictions like the Netherlands.

1. Corporate Profile & Business Model

Contiant Ltd markets itself as an “Open Banking Services Provider” specializing in high-risk verticals, including iGaming, Forex, and Crypto.​

• Legal Entity: Contiant Ltd.
• Registration: Registered in Bulgaria (UIC/Tax Number: 207006641).​
• Headquarters: Sofia, Bulgaria.​
• Regulatory Status: Contiant appears to operate without its own financial license. Its Terms of Use explicitly state that it provides “technical services and implementation” for Open Banking. It relies entirely on the license of third-party regulated entities (primarily Yapily) to touch the actual funds.​

2. The Yapily Connection: A “Borrowed” License

The most critical compliance finding is Contiant’s structural reliance on Yapily, a major UK/Lithuanian open banking infrastructure provider.

• The Mechanism: When a player deposits at an offshore casino like Winning.io via Contiant, the actual Payment Initiation Service (PIS) is executed by Yapily Connect UAB (authorized by the Bank of Lithuania). The user interface explicitly states “Powered by Yapily” and redirects players to “Authorize Yapily Connect UAB” via their banking app.
• The Regulatory Gap: By acting as a “technical” layer, Contiant effectively insulates Yapily from direct exposure to the casino. However, the result is that Yapily’s regulated rails are being used to settle illegal gambling debts. The volume of traffic suggests that Yapily is either failing to monitor its agent/partner activity or is knowingly accepting this high-risk flow via the Contiant proxy.

3. Traffic Intelligence & High-Risk Focus

Our analysis confirms that Contiant is almost exclusively dedicated to high-risk and offshore gambling traffic.

• Referral Sources: 100% of referral traffic to the payment subdomain paywith.contiant.com originates from unregulated offshore casinos, including Skyhills, Epicbet, Shakebet, WBetz, and Winning.io.
• Geographic Targeting: Over 95% of traffic originates from the Netherlands, a jurisdiction with strict gambling regulations (KSA). This indicates that Contiant is the primary gateway for Dutch players to access illegal casinos.
• Banking Connections: The top outgoing links from Contiant are to major Dutch and European banks (ING, Rabobank, Revolut, KBC), confirming its role in facilitating prohibited bank-to-casino transfers.

4. Leadership

Public records identify the following individuals behind Contiant:​

• Ivo Dimitrov: Co-Founder & CEO.
• Dimitar Kostov: Co-Founder & CTO.
• George Matev: Co-Founder & Partner.

Revolut and the “Open Banking Game”

The transaction cascade visualized in the “Open Banking Game” graphic reflects a layered structure in which Revolut’s open‑banking infrastructure is ultimately used to fund deposits at illegal offshore casinos such as Winning.io and LuckyWins, without Revolut having a direct contractual relationship with these operators. In this model, offshore casinos integrate Contiant as their front‑end payment gateway; Contiant in turn relies on Yapily Connect UAB as the licensed PSD2/Open Banking provider, which finally connects to Revolut via the oba.revolut.com API to initiate account‑to‑account payments from EU players’ Revolut accounts.​

Read our report on Winning.io and its shadow banking approach.

Player journeys observed during the Winning.io test clearly show this cascade: after selecting “instant banking” or Revolut as the funding option, users are redirected to paywith.contiant.com, then to a Yapily consent screen (“Sign in to Revolut to authorize Yapily Connect UAB”), and finally into the Revolut environment to approve the payment.

Similar flows have been documented for LuckyWins and other offshore brands that use Contiant, with traffic intelligence (Similarweb, November 2025) indicating that nearly all referral traffic to paywith.contiant.com originates from unlicensed casinos, and more than 95% of users come from the Netherlands—a jurisdiction where these operators are explicitly illegal.​

From a compliance standpoint, this layered structure creates a situation in which Revolut economically benefits from payment flows that in substance represent gambling deposits to unlicensed operators, while being able to point to Yapily (as PISP) and Contiant (as “technical gateway”) as intermediaries. Nonetheless, Revolut remains responsible for robust AML/CTF and transaction‑monitoring controls over outgoing payments and for risk‑based oversight of third‑party providers accessing its open‑banking APIs.

Sustained high‑volume flows via Yapily to Contiant, combined with the clear casino‑only traffic profile of paywith.contiant.com and the concentration in a high‑risk market like the Netherlands, constitute a pattern of elevated risk that should reasonably trigger enhanced due diligence, restriction of specific counterparties, or termination of high‑risk partners.

Summary Data: Contiant

📢 Call to Whistleblowers

Are you an employee at Yapily or Contiant? Do you have information regarding the due diligence (or lack thereof) performed on these offshore casino clients?

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