FinTelegram has received a new player complaint pointing to a suspected Open-Banking casino funding rail involving Yapily Connect UAB, Pellopay Finance LTD, UAB Travel Union, Paysolo/Contiant, and the offshore casino brand Immerion. The case shows a familiar pattern: regulated payment infrastructure appears to have been used to fund offshore casino accounts while the visible SEPA payee was not the casino, but a payment intermediary.
The complainant, whose identity is known to FinTelegram but withheld for privacy reasons, compiled a comprehensive dossier documenting his open banking deposits in February 2026. According to the submitted dossier, the payment flow was initiated via Yapily Connect UAB and routed through a Paysolo/Contiant interface, while the visible receiving party was Pellopay Finance LTD, holding an account at UAB Travel Union in Lithuania. The dossier is supported by screenshots over the deposit processes.
The casino allegedly funded through this structure: Immerion Casino.
The Alleged Rail
The submitted evidence suggests the following payment chain:
And I would update the rail table accordingly:
| Layer | Entity / Evidence | Function in the alleged rail |
|---|---|---|
| Player Bank | Revolut EU | Source account used by the player |
| Casino Layer | Immerion Casino | Casino account allegedly credited with deposits |
| Checkout / Orchestration Layer | Paysolo / king.paysolo.net | Visible payment page routing the player into bank authentication |
| Gateway / Hosted Page Layer | Contiant / th.contiant.com | Additional payment-page / routing infrastructure visible in screenshots |
| Open-Banking Layer | Yapily Connect UAB / https://www.yapily.com/ | PISP / payment-initiation infrastructure |
| Visible SEPA Payee | Pellopay Finance LTD / https://pellopay.com | Named recipient of the transfers |
| Account Infrastructure | UAB Travel Union / https://mytu.co | Bank/account infrastructure for Pellopay |
| Result | Immerion Casino Deposit | Casino deposit allegedly credited after the payment flow |
This is the red flag: the player says he funded a casino account, but the visible SEPA beneficiary was Pellopay Finance LTD — not Immerion Casino.
The Payment Evidence: Casino Deposit, Paysolo Checkout, Yapily Initiation, Pellopay Payee
The submitted evidence does not merely show a player claiming to have lost funds at an offshore casino. It shows a sequence of payment screenshots that appear to connect the casino deposit process with an Open-Banking payment rail.
The evidence package includes:
| Evidence Layer | What The Documents Show | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Casino layer | Screenshots from immerion4.com showing casino deposits in different amounts | Indicates that the player’s casino account was credited with matching deposit amounts. |
| Checkout layer | A Paysolo-branded checkout page at openbanking.paysolo.net, showing a payment order, Revolut EU as selected bank, and an instruction to authenticate the payment | Places Paysolo as the visible cashier / payment-orchestration layer between the casino and the Open-Banking flow. |
| PISP layer | Payment confirmation screens naming Yapily Connect UAB as the Open-Banking payment initiation provider | Shows that the payment was initiated through regulated Open-Banking infrastructure. |
| Visible SEPA payee | Revolut receipts showing Pellopay Finance LTD as recipient of the payments | Shows that the visible beneficiary was not the casino, but Pellopay. |
| Bank/account infrastructure | Revolut receipts naming UAB Travel Union as bank/account infrastructure, with BIC UATULT22XXX and an IBAN beginning LT68 3480… | Identifies the Lithuanian account layer used for the Pellopay recipient account. |
| Technical logs | GDPR/Open-Banking records containing payment references, consent IDs and idempotency IDs | Provides API-level metadata linking the payment-initiation flow to the same transactions. |
The submitted screenshots place Paysolo at the open-banking checkout layer. This is consistent with FinTelegram’s earlier Rail Atlas findings around openbanking.paysolo.net, where Paysolo appears as a user-facing open-banking gateway between casino-facing cashier layers and regulated Open-Banking infrastructure.
The Paysolo-branded payment interface with the selected bank Revolut EU asks the player to press Authenticate to continue with the bank website. The Paysolo page points into a Pellopay/Yapily payment-initiation flow in the Revolut rail, with Pellopay Finance LTD appearing as the visible SEPA payee.
The Revolut screenshots then show completed transfers to Pellopay Finance LTD, including amounts of €100, €130, €200 and €400, while the casino screenshots from immerion4.com show corresponding deposit credits in the same amount range.
This creates the core forensic red flag:
The player appears to have funded a casino account, but the Open-Banking payment journey exposed Paysolo as the checkout layer and Pellopay Finance LTD as the visible SEPA payee — not Immerion Casino.
The Paysolo Problem.
The screenshots place Paysolo at the visible Open-Banking checkout layer. This is significant because paysolo.net does not present the transparency one would expect from a payment layer embedded in regulated Open-Banking flows. FinTelegram has previously identified openbanking.paysolo.net in casino-facing payment corridors involving Pagagate, Urbenics and Revolut.
In the present complaint, Paysolo again appears as the bridge between the casino cashier and the Yapily/Pellopay payment-initiation flow. That raises the core question: who operates the Paysolo gateway, who contracted with it, and what merchant information was passed downstream to Yapily, Pellopay and the player’s bank?
FinTelegram has not yet established whether Paysolo contracted directly with Immerion, Pellopay, Yapily, Contiant, or another intermediary. But the screenshots make Paysolo a critical node in the payment chain. Any serious inquiry must therefore include Paysolo, not just Yapily, Pellopay and UAB Travel Union.
Yapily’s Response: “We Are Only PIS/AIS Infrastructure”
The complainant provided a response from Yapily’s compliance team. Yapily stated that it had acted in line with its regulatory role as a PIS/AIS provider. It said it does not open or control bank accounts, does not hold or control customer funds, does not intervene in payment transactions, and cannot return payments because it is neither the sending nor the receiving bank.
That may be technically correct. But it is not the end of the compliance question.
If Open-Banking payment initiation infrastructure is repeatedly used to route funds into offshore casino accounts through payment intermediaries, the relevant questions are obvious:
- Who was Yapily’s direct client in this flow?
- What due diligence was conducted on the use case?
- Did Yapily know that the payment flow was funding an offshore casino account?
- Were gambling-risk filters applied?
- Why did the visible payee not clearly identify the casino end-use?
FinTelegram is not accusing Yapily of holding player funds. The question is different: Was Yapily’s regulated Open-Banking infrastructure used as a casino funding rail?
Pellopay: The Visible Payee
Pellopay Finance LTD, a FINTRAC-registered Canadian money service provider, is a critical node in this complaint. According to the submitted evidence, Pellopay appears as the direct recipient of the SEPA transfers, while the player alleges that the funds were credited to his Immerion Casino account.
A Paysolo-branded checkout page was prompted to the player to authenticate a Revolut payment. The page referred to Pellopay Finance LTD and Yapily Connect, suggesting that Paysolo acted as a front-end checkout or routing layer between the casino cashier and the regulated Open-Banking payment initiation flow. FinTelegram has not yet established whether Paysolo contracted directly with the casino, Pellopay, Yapily, or another intermediary.
The complainant also provided a Pellopay response stating that the matter was outside Pellopay’s scope of responsibility, that the payment had been processed and received by the merchant, and that refunds must be initiated directly by the merchant.
The Gmail Support Red Flag. Pellopay appears as the visible SEPA payee in the player’s Revolut receipts. Yet the support communication provided to FinTelegram appears to involve a Gmail address rather than a corporate Pellopay domain. That is highly unusual for a payment intermediary sitting inside a regulated Open-Banking rail. Who exactly was communicating with the player — Pellopay itself, an outsourced support desk, a merchant operator, a cashier provider, or another intermediary?
That answer raises the central question:
If Pellopay was the visible payee, who was the merchant behind Pellopay’s collection flow? “Contact the merchant” is not enough. In opaque casino payment rails, the payment intermediary is often the only entity visible to the player and the bank. Pellopay should explain whether it acted for Immerion, an affiliate, a payment gateway, a cashier provider, or another merchant-of-record.
UAB Travel Union: Infrastructure Layer
The Revolut payment screenshots identify UAB Travel Union as the bank/account infrastructure connected to the Pellopay recipient account.
FinTelegram does not allege that UAB Travel Union knowingly processed illegal casino payments. But where a regulated Lithuanian institution appears as the account infrastructure for a payment intermediary allegedly collecting funds for an offshore casino, the compliance question is unavoidable:
What did UAB Travel Union know about Pellopay’s underlying merchants and payment purposes?
The complainant alleges that UAB Travel Union initially indicated it would investigate but later stopped responding. FinTelegram will ask UAB Travel Union to comment.
Parallel Lead: Techoptions / Hellspin
TechOptions is the smoking parallel lead. The evidence package does not only point to Pellopay and Immerion. It also shows a separate Yapily-powered payment screen naming Techoptions (CY) Group Ltd as merchant, followed by Revolut evidence via ISX Financial.
TechOptions’ website says the group is “home to” Hellspin and Ivibet, describes itself as an online casino management company, and lists Techoptions (CY) Group Ltd, Nicosia, as billing agent. That makes the TechOptions leg highly relevant: it places the Yapily/Open-Banking flow directly next to a declared iGaming operator, not some generic e-commerce merchant.
This matters because it suggests the issue may not be limited to Pellopay and Immerion.
It may point to a broader pattern: Open-Banking rails being used by or around offshore iGaming operators to move player deposits through regulated payment infrastructure.
KYC Pressure And Possible Data-Sharing Red Flag
The complainant also submitted screenshots of KYC demands from Immerion and Ybets. Both request copies of ID documents and a selfie with the ID document. The complainant alleges that these requests appeared after he raised disputes and that he had not interacted with Ybets.
FinTelegram treats this as a data-sharing red flag, not yet as proof of a GDPR breach.
Possible explanations include common casino ownership, shared affiliate infrastructure, shared KYC providers, shared CRM systems, or unauthorized data circulation. The point requires further investigation. But the timing and similarity of the KYC requests are noteworthy.
FinTelegram Assessment
This case is not a classic insider leak. It is a player-side payment complaint. But it is backed by more than screenshots of a casino loss.
The file contains:
- Open-Banking payment confirmation screens;
- Revolut payment receipts;
- Pellopay recipient details;
- UAB Travel Union account infrastructure references;
- Yapily compliance correspondence;
- Pellopay correspondence;
- Casino deposit screenshots;
- GDPR/Open-Banking transaction references;
- a parallel Techoptions / Hellspin-related lead.
The emerging pattern is clear:
Regulated Open-Banking infrastructure appears to have been used to fund offshore casino accounts while the visible SEPA payee was not the casino but a payment intermediary.
That is a regulatory issue. It is not merely a private player-refund dispute.
Questions For Yapily, Pellopay, UAB Travel Union And Immerion
FinTelegram will ask the involved parties to answer the following questions:
- Did Yapily Connect UAB initiate payment flows that ultimately funded Immerion Casino accounts?
- Who was Yapily’s direct client in the Pellopay / Immerion flow?
- Did Yapily know that the payment purpose was online gambling or casino funding?
- Why was Pellopay Finance LTD the visible SEPA payee instead of the casino operator?
- Who was the legal merchant-of-record behind the Pellopay collection flow?
- What due diligence did Pellopay perform on the underlying merchant or casino cashier provider?
- What role did UAB Travel Union play in providing account infrastructure to Pellopay?
- Did UAB Travel Union classify or monitor these flows as gambling-related?
- Were any suspicious activity reports or internal AML escalations filed?
- Are Immerion and Ybets connected through ownership, affiliate infrastructure, KYC providers, CRM systems, or payment providers?
Call For Information
FinTelegram is seeking information from:
- players who deposited into Immerion Casino via Open Banking, Revolut, Yapily, Paysolo, Contiant, Pellopay or UAB Travel Union;
- players who saw Pellopay Finance LTD as payee after funding casino accounts;
- insiders at Yapily, Pellopay, UAB Travel Union, Paysolo, Contiant, ISX Financial, Techoptions, Immerion or related casino cashier providers;
- compliance officers with knowledge of Open-Banking casino funding flows.
Information can be submitted confidentially via the FinTelegram whistleblower platform.
Open Banking was designed to make payments faster and safer. It was not designed to become a shadow cashier layer for offshore casinos.
