Tag: Illegal Gambling

Passpoint markets itself as a financial orchestration platform for Africa, Europe, and G20 payment corridors. But FinTelegram’s Betify review found something far more problematic: Passpoint Sp. z o.o., its Polish entity, appeared as the named payee in an open-banking/bank-transfer rail used to fund Betify, an offshore casino accessible from EU jurisdictions. This is not a passive API footprint.

FinTelegram’s May 2026 review of Betify shows a materially reconfigured payment architecture compared with the August 2024 review. The visible corporate wrapper has changed from Altacore N.V. / Altaprime Limited to Fortuna Games N.V. / Deltaprime Limited, but the underlying risk pattern remains: EU players can apparently access and fund an offshore casino through layered payment rails.

FinTelegram’s latest Revolut Rail Atlas review of 1Go Casino shows how a player-facing offshore casino cashier can route deposits through a multi-layered payment stack before reaching a regulated open-banking interface. In the tested Revolut flow, the user journey moved from 1Go Casino through BillBlend, SegoPay, Tryzto, InstantBankPayment, Yapily Connect UAB, and finally oba.revolut.com, where the user was asked to authorise Yapily Connect UAB.

FinTelegram has reviewed a whistleblower report indicating that Germany’s financial watchdog BaFin has registered a case concerning Yapily Connect UAB, the Lithuanian licensed arm of the UK open-banking group Yapily. The allegations are explosive: regulated Pay by Bank infrastructure was allegedly used to process deposits for offshore casino brands targeting German players.

Illegal casino networks are no longer just websites. They are hidden routing systems that adapt domains, bonus offers and payment options to a player’s location, device and behaviour. FinTelegram explains how mirror domains, affiliate funnels, geo-routing engines and payment agents help offshore gambling networks bypass website blocks, gambling controls and banking transparency — while players see only a polished casino front end.

FinTelegram’s review of GoldenBet shows a diversified payment architecture around the Santeda Group: card deposits evidenced through Payabl, wallet deposits showing Santeda International Limited as beneficiary via MiFinity, and an Open Banking rail through Bilderlings → Yapily Connect → Revolut’s Open Banking API. This is no longer a single-PSP complaint story. It is a Rail Atlas case study in how offshore casino operators maintain EU-facing payment continuity

A German player’s GDPR request has exposed a critical compliance issue: the Cyprus-regulated EMI Payabl processed multiple credit card deposits to Santeda International Limited, the payment agent behind offshore casino GoldenBet, which operates without an EU license. Despite being alerted to the illegality and the player’s gambling addiction, Payabl refused refunds,

Whistleblower dossiers and prior reporting place eMoore N.V. and the broader EM Group at the management and Cyprus-linked payment layer of a Europe-facing online casino network. The key issue is a stark contradiction: while EM Group publicly marketed compliance and licensing expertise, its structures appear in the documentary chain of operators targeting regulated EU markets without national authorization.

A player communication reviewed by FinTelegram raises a serious compliance question for Revolut: did the fintech initially tell a customer that Mastercard chargebacks had been raised and finally decided, only to later admit that no chargebacks had been submitted at all? Against the backdrop of FinTelegram’s long-running investigations into illegal offshore casino payment rails, the case sharpens a broader issue.

While European gambling regulators intensify their crackdown on illegal offshore casinos, a more uncomfortable question is emerging for the banking sector: are major retail banks, through rigid chargeback practices and weak scrutiny of miscoded card transactions, helping illegal gambling networks stay operational?