FinTelegram’s May 2026 review of Betify shows a materially reconfigured payment architecture compared with the August 2024 review. The visible corporate wrapper has changed from Altacore N.V. / Altaprime Limited to Fortuna Games N.V. / Deltaprime Limited, but the underlying risk pattern remains: EU players can apparently access and fund an offshore casino through layered payment rails involving open banking, wallets, crypto purchase flows, Binance Pay, card gateways, voucher payments, and third-party payees that obscure the true gambling beneficiary.
Key Findings
- Betify’s visible corporate setup has changed. In August 2024, Betify was linked to Altacore N.V. in Curaçao and Altaprime Limited in Cyprus. In the May 2026 review, Betify names Fortuna Games N.V. as operator and Deltaprime Limited in Cyprus as EEA representative/payment-facing entity.
- The jurisdictional model remains substantially the same. Despite the name change, the structure still follows the familiar pattern of a Curaçao offshore casino with a Cyprus-based EU-facing layer.
- EU access and deposit initiation remained possible. During the May 6, 2026 review, registration and simulated deposit flows were accessible from EU jurisdictions, despite no evidence that Betify holds the required gambling licenses in those jurisdictions.
- The bank-transfer rail exposed an open banking chokepoint. Betify routed users through
checkout.instantbankpayment.com, where players were shown a bank-selection interface and Yapily Connect terms. - Yapily Connect UAB appeared inside the open banking flow. The Revolut authorization screen stated that the player was authorizing Yapily Connect UAB, a regulated Lithuanian payment institution. This raises questions about Yapily’s onboarding, merchant-screening, and payment-purpose controls.
- Passpoint Sp. z o.o. appeared as the payee in the Revolut/Wise bank-transfer flow. The visible payee was not Betify, Fortuna Games N.V., or Deltaprime Limited, but the Polish company Passpoint Sp. z o.o., creating a clear merchant-of-record and payee-opacity issue.
- The screenshots do not prove that Yapily controls InstantBankPayment. They confirm that Yapily terms and authorization appeared in the flow, but ownership or control of
checkout.instantbankpayment.comremains unverified and requires clarification. - MiFinity deposits showed Buscarar LLC as recipient. The MiFinity rail did not display Betify or Fortuna/Deltaprime as recipient, but Buscarar LLC, adding another opaque third-party payee layer.
- Skrill and Neteller rails operated as fake-FIAT crypto flows. The player selected familiar wallet methods but was routed through Nylo, where the transaction was framed as buying crypto and sending it to a specified address.
- Nylo acted as a crypto-purchase intermediary. The Nylo screen showed an exchange order and required confirmation that the user agreed to buy crypto and send it onward. The origin of the crypto, the destination wallet owner, and the final beneficiary were not disclosed on the reviewed screen.
- No evidence currently confirms ChainValley’s role in the Betify/Nylo flow. ChainValley has appeared in similar Skrill/Neteller fake-FIAT casino flows in other reviews, but its involvement in this specific Betify rail is not confirmed.
- The eps rail powered by Skrill showed Deskimopay as recipient. The local bank-transfer rail did not identify the gambling operator as recipient, but instead displayed Deskimopay.
- The Visa/card rail used a layered routing chain. The observed route was: Betify →
checkout.processingpsp.co→tx.segopay.com→api.axipays.com→ Skrill. - The card test showed “BLUETECH GBP” as recipient/descriptor. This creates a descriptor-opacity concern and raises questions about the merchant of record, acquirer, and transaction coding.
- Binance Pay was routed through CryptonBTC. The Binance Pay option used
pay2.cryptonbtc.combefore redirecting to Binance Pay, adding another opaque crypto-gateway layer. - Flexepin was also available as a deposit method. The presence of voucher/prepaid-style funding adds a cash-like deposit option to the payment stack.
- The overall payment architecture is fragmented and opaque. The May 2026 setup involves open banking, wallets, fake-FIAT crypto flows, card gateways, Binance Pay, and voucher payments, with multiple third-party payees appearing instead of the gambling operator.
- The central compliance issue is merchant-of-record opacity. Across several rails, the visible recipient differs from the gambling brand and named operator, suggesting that the payment architecture separates the casino-facing experience from the payment-facing merchant identity.
- The strongest regulatory chokepoints are the payment providers, not only the offshore casino. The relevant supervisory focus should include Yapily, Revolut/Wise endpoints, MiFinity, Skrill/Neteller/Paysafe, Binance Pay, Axipays, SegoPay, card acquirers, and the third-party payees.
- The May 2026 review does not show remediation compared with August 2024. It shows a broader and more complex rail architecture, with more intermediaries, more third-party payees, and more crypto-conversion elements.
Read our initial Betify review here.
Evidence Grading
| Finding | Evidence grade | Basis |
|---|---|---|
Betify accessible via betify2.so and deposits could be initiated from EU jurisdictions | Confirmed | FinTelegram simulated review and screenshots |
| Current Betify setup names Fortuna Games N.V. and Deltaprime Limited | Confirmed | Betify FAQ and company-data references |
| Previous setup identified Altacore N.V. and Altaprime Limited | Confirmed | FinTelegram August 2024 review and RatEx42 profile |
| InstantBankPayment rail presented Yapily Connect terms | Confirmed | FinTelegram screenshots |
| Yapily Connect UAB is regulated by Bank of Lithuania under LB002045 | Confirmed | Bank of Lithuania / Yapily disclosures |
Yapily controls or operates checkout.instantbankpayment.com | Unknown / Requires clarification | Screenshots show Yapily terms, but do not prove control or ownership of the gateway |
| Passpoint Sp. z o.o. appeared as payee in Revolut/Wise bank-transfer flow | Confirmed by screenshot; registry corroborated | FinTelegram screenshots plus Polish company data |
| Nylo was used as intermediary for Skrill/Neteller crypto-purchase flow | Confirmed | FinTelegram screenshots |
| Nylo markets itself as a payment gateway | Confirmed | Nylo public website |
| ChainValley is behind Nylo in this specific Betify flow | Unknown | Pattern seen in other reviews, but not confirmed here |
| Buscarar LLC appeared as MiFinity recipient | Confirmed by screenshot | FinTelegram screenshots |
| Deskimopay appeared as eps/Skrill recipient | Confirmed by screenshot | FinTelegram screenshots |
| BLUETECH GBP appeared as card recipient/descriptor | Confirmed by screenshot/test payment | FinTelegram simulated payment |
| Axipays appears in the card routing chain | Confirmed by screenshot; public PSP role corroborated | FinTelegram screenshots plus Axipays public website |
| CryptonBTC routed Binance Pay flow | Confirmed by screenshot; public page opaque | FinTelegram screenshot; search result shows no public information for pay2.cryptonbtc.com |
Then vs Now: Betify Review Comparison
| Area | August 2024 Review | May 2026 Review | Compliance interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operator | Altacore N.V., Curaçao | Fortuna Games N.V., Curaçao | Corporate wrapper changed; offshore model remains |
| EU/Cyprus layer | Altaprime Limited | Deltaprime Limited | Cyprus-facing payment/representative layer persists |
| Domain pattern | Betify and related/mirror domains | betify2.so used in review | Domain-shifting remains relevant |
| Core issue | Unauthorized offshore casino access and open banking exposure | Open banking, wallets, fake-FIAT crypto, Binance Pay, card routing, voucher rails | Payment architecture became broader and more fragmented |
| Main compliance concern | EU access through offshore casino and payment facilitators | Third-party payees, regulated chokepoints, fake-FIAT conversion, descriptor opacity | Risk increased in complexity |
| Key regulated chokepoints | Open banking/payment providers | Yapily, Revolut/Wise endpoints, MiFinity, Skrill/Neteller/Paysafe, Binance Pay, card processors | Supervisory focus should shift to payment rails |
FinTelegram’s August 2024 review described Betify as part of the Altacore/Altaprime structure and highlighted open banking concerns. The May 2026 review does not show a clean remediation of that issue. Instead, it shows a broader payment stack with more intermediaries, more third-party payees, and more crypto-conversion logic.
Summary Table: Betify and Payment-Rail Entities
| Category | Entity / Domain | Role observed | Jurisdiction / status | Evidence grade | Compliance relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Casino brand | Betify / betify2.so | Offshore casino interface accessed in review | Public site names Curaçao operator | Confirmed | Main gambling destination |
| Current operator | Fortuna Games N.V. | Named operator | Curaçao | Confirmed | Offshore gambling operator |
| Current Cyprus layer | Deltaprime Limited | EEA representative of Fortuna Games N.V. | Cyprus, HE 444864 | Confirmed | EU-facing corporate layer |
| Previous operator | Altacore N.V. | Operator identified in 2024 | Curaçao | Confirmed | Replaced visible operator |
| Previous Cyprus layer | Altaprime Limited | Payment agent/payment processor identified in 2024 | Cyprus | Confirmed | Replaced visible Cyprus layer |
| Open banking gateway | checkout.instantbankpayment.com | Bank-selection and payment interface | Operator unknown | Confirmed by screenshot | Anonymous gateway / control unclear |
| Regulated open banking provider | Yapily; Yapily Connect UAB | Terms shown; Revolut authorization flow | Lithuania, LB002045 | Confirmed | Regulated chokepoint |
| Bank endpoint | Revolut OBA | Authorization page for Yapily Connect UAB | Revolut interface | Confirmed by screenshot | Bank-access endpoint |
| Bank endpoint | Wise | Payee flow reportedly also showed Passpoint | Wise interface | Confirmed by review | Alternative A2A endpoint |
| Bank-transfer payee | Passpoint Sp. z o.o. (LinkedIn) | Payee in Revolut/Wise flow | Poland, KRS 0001139121 | Confirmed/corroborated | Third-party payee risk |
| Wallet provider | MiFinity | Deposit rail | Global wallet provider | Confirmed by screenshot | Wallet funding rail |
| MiFinity payee | Buscarar LLC | Recipient shown in MiFinity flow | Not verified | Confirmed by screenshot | Payee opacity |
| Crypto-purchase interface | Nylo / Nylo LLCapp.nylo.pro | Buy-crypto-and-send flow | Public website markets payment gateway | Confirmed | Fake-FIAT crypto rail |
| Wallet provider | Neteller /Skril | Used to complete Nylo crypto purchase | Paysafe brand | Confirmed | Wallet-to-crypto route |
| eps payee | Deskimopay | Recipient in eps/Skrill flow | Not verified | Confirmed by screenshot | Opaque local-method recipient |
| Card gateway | checkout.processingpsp.co | Card payment page | Unknown | Confirmed by screenshot | Anonymous card gateway |
| Card-routing layer | SegoPay / tx.segopay.com | Intermediate redirect | Not fully verified | Confirmed by screenshot | Routing layer |
| Processor/API layer | Axipays / api.axipays.com | Intermediate API domain | Public site describes PSP services | Confirmed/corroborated | Processor exposure |
| Card descriptor | BLUETECH GBP | Recipient/descriptor in card test | Not verified | Confirmed by test | Descriptor opacity |
| Crypto gateway | CryptonBTC / pay2.cryptonbtc.com | Binance Pay routing domain | Public info unavailable | Confirmed by screenshot | Crypto-gateway opacity |
| Crypto payment method | Binance Pay | Final crypto-payment interface | Binance ecosystem | Confirmed | Crypto-payment rail |
| Voucher method | Flexepin | Available deposit option | Voucher/prepaid rail | Confirmed by cashier | Cash-like funding risk |
Core Finding 1: The Corporate Wrapper Changed, the Jurisdictional Model Did Not
The visible corporate setup changed materially between August 2024 and May 2026. In 2024, Betify was linked to Altacore N.V. in Curaçao and Altaprime Limited in Cyprus. In 2026, Betify names Fortuna Games N.V. and Deltaprime Limited. The jurisdictions, however, remain functionally similar: Curaçao as offshore gambling base and Cyprus as the EU-facing corporate or payment-facing layer.
This should not be interpreted as a compliance upgrade without further evidence. A change of operator/payment-agent names does not resolve the central issue if EU players can still register, deposit, and fund gambling accounts through payment infrastructure that does not transparently identify the true gambling merchant.
Compliance assessment: the corporate change should be treated as a risk event requiring enhanced due diligence. Payment providers should verify whether the migration from Altacore/Altaprime to Fortuna/Deltaprime reflects a genuine licensing, ownership, and control change, or merely a re-papering of the same gambling and payment infrastructure.
Core Finding 2: Open Banking Rail — InstantBankPayment, Yapily, Revolut/Wise, and Passpoint
The bank-transfer rail led to checkout.instantbankpayment.com, where the user was shown a bank-selection interface. In the reviewed flow, the user was then routed toward Revolut. The Revolut page stated that the user was signing in to authorize Yapily Connect UAB. The InstantBankPayment screen also presented Yapily Connect terms.
Read our reports on Yapily here.
Yapily Connect UAB is a regulated Lithuanian payment institution supervised by the Bank of Lithuania under authorization number LB002045. Yapily’s own materials state that Yapily Connect UAB is incorporated in Lithuania and regulated by the Bank of Lithuania under the same authorization number.
The payee identified in the open banking flow was Passpoint Sp. z o.o., not Betify, Fortuna Games N.V., or Deltaprime Limited. Polish company data identifies Passpoint Sp. z o.o. under KRS 0001139121 and links it to Adejuwon Oyebanjo (LinkedIn) and Kelechi Uchegbulem (LinkedIn).
Read more about Passpoint here.
Compliance concern: an EU player appears able to fund an offshore casino through an open banking flow in which the visible payee is a third-party Polish company. That pattern raises merchant-of-record, AML, transaction-monitoring, consumer-disclosure, and gambling-licensing questions.
Core Finding 3: Fake-FIAT Crypto Rails via Nylo, Skrill, and Neteller
The Neteller and Skrill rails are not simple wallet deposits. They are the most significant fake-FIAT finding in this review.
The user selects Neteller or Skrill as a familiar payment method. The flow then redirects to Nylo at app.nylo.pro. The Nylo screen displays an exchange order and requires the user to confirm that they agree to buy crypto and send it to the specified address. The user is then routed to Skrill or Neteller to complete the payment. Nylo publicly describes itself as a payment gateway processing multiple currencies through its own infrastructure and partners.
This structure is materially different from a straightforward wallet deposit. The player-facing method looks like a fiat/wallet payment, but the transaction is structured as a crypto purchase and onward transfer. The origin of the crypto, the wallet destination, the beneficial owner of the destination address, and the contractual merchant relationship are not disclosed on the reviewed screen.
Paysafe publicly markets Skrill and Neteller as digital wallet payment methods and states that Paysafe Payment Solutions Limited trades as Paysafe, Neteller, Skrill, Rapid Transfer, and Skrill Money Transfer and is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland.
Compliance concern: the fake-FIAT model may reduce transparency for the player, weaken recovery or chargeback expectations, and obscure the true gambling beneficiary from financial institutions. It may also shift the transaction from gambling funding into crypto acquisition, creating a different compliance footprint for AML, travel-rule, sanctions, and source-of-funds controls.
Core Finding 4: MiFinity and Buscarar LLC
The MiFinity rail showed Buscarar LLC as the recipient. The screenshot does not identify Fortuna Games N.V., Deltaprime Limited, or Betify as the direct payment recipient.
This is important because the same Betify ecosystem appears to have used different corporate wrappers across domains and time periods. A third-party recipient in a wallet flow requires clarification: is Buscarar LLC a payment agent, merchant of record, reseller, affiliate, crypto facilitator, or unrelated payment processor?
Compliance concern: MiFinity should be able to identify the contractual merchant, the actual gambling beneficiary, the settlement recipient, and the jurisdictional legality assessment applied to Betify-related deposits.
Core Finding 5: eps Powered by Skrill — Deskimopay as Recipient
The eps rail, powered by Skrill, showed Deskimopay as recipient. The screen stated that eps was not available and recommended MyBank – Bonifico immediato, but the displayed recipient layer remains relevant.
Paysafe’s public materials identify eps and other local payment methods as part of the Paysafe/Skrill/Neteller ecosystem, with Paysafe Payment Solutions Limited regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland.
Compliance concern: local bank-transfer methods such as eps and MyBank are trusted by consumers as ordinary bank-payment rails. In a gambling context, the appearance of an unrelated recipient name creates a duty to examine whether the merchant identity and gambling purpose were properly disclosed to the consumer and to the regulated payment chain.
Core Finding 6: Card Rail — processingpsp.co, SegoPay, Axipays, Skrill, and BLUETECH GBP
The Visa/card rail showed a layered path:
Betify Cashier → checkout.processingpsp.co → tx.segopay.com → api.axipays.com → Skrill → BLUETECH GBP
The card screen showed a Betify-related deposit reference, but the recipient/descriptor surfaced in the test was BLUETECH GBP. Axipays publicly describes itself as a payment gateway specializing in credit-card processing, crypto payments, and risk-management services.
Compliance concern: this rail raises classic card-processing red flags: descriptor mismatch, payment orchestration opacity, potential payment-facilitator layering, and possible transaction-laundering risk. The cardholder is not clearly presented with the offshore gambling operator as the merchant of record.
Core Finding 7: Binance Pay via CryptonBTC
The Binance Pay rail was initiated through pay2.cryptonbtc.com and then redirected to Binance Pay. The public search result for pay2.cryptonbtc.com shows no meaningful information, which itself is a transparency concern for a payment gateway involved in casino funding.
Binance Pay is a crypto payment method that supports a broad range of cryptocurrencies and enables users to send or pay with crypto.
Compliance concern: Binance Pay should examine whether CryptonBTC or the merchant behind the QR/payment request is properly onboarded, whether the gambling purpose is disclosed, whether the destination wallet belongs to a licensed operator or payment agent, and whether EU gambling restrictions are reflected in merchant monitoring.
Compliance Analysis
1. Merchant-of-record opacity
The dominant pattern is that the visible payee often differs from the gambling brand and the named operator. The user sees Passpoint, Buscarar, Nylo, Deskimopay, or BLUETECH GBP rather than Fortuna Games N.V., Deltaprime Limited, or Betify.
This is the central compliance problem. It suggests that the payment architecture may be designed to separate the player-facing gambling experience from the payment-facing merchant identity.
2. Regulated chokepoints inside high-risk flows
The case is not merely about an offshore Curaçao casino. The critical issue is the use of regulated or mainstream payment chokepoints:
Yapily Connect UAB, Revolut/Wise-style account-to-account flows, MiFinity, Skrill/Neteller/Paysafe, Binance Pay, and card-processing gateways.
These providers are the points where merchant onboarding, transaction monitoring, payment-purpose detection, and jurisdictional blocking should occur.
3. Fake-FIAT conversion risk
The Nylo/Skrill/Neteller structure is particularly problematic because it blurs the line between fiat casino deposit, wallet payment, crypto purchase, and crypto transfer. The player may believe they are using a normal wallet rail, while the actual transaction is framed as purchasing crypto and sending it onward.
That structure creates a material consumer-protection and AML issue.
4. Open banking as a casino-funding rail
Open banking payments are account-to-account transfers. They are fast, difficult to reverse, and often lack the dispute expectations associated with card payments. When such rails are used for offshore gambling, the compliance burden on open banking providers and bank endpoints is especially high.
5. Descriptor and payee mismatch
The appearance of BLUETECH GBP, Passpoint, Buscarar, and Deskimopay suggests descriptor and payee opacity. This should trigger enhanced due diligence by acquirers, banks, wallet providers, open banking providers, and card schemes.
Conclusion
The May 2026 Betify review does not show a cleaned-up payment architecture. It shows a more fragmented one.
The visible corporate setup has changed from Altacore N.V. / Altaprime Limited to Fortuna Games N.V. / Deltaprime Limited, but the fundamental risk remains: EU players can apparently access and fund an offshore casino through payment rails that separate the gambling brand from the visible payee.
The most important findings are:
- Open Banking Chokepoint: the InstantBankPayment flow presented Yapily Connect terms and routed through Revolut/Wise-style bank flows, with Passpoint Sp. z o.o. shown as payee.
- Fake-FIAT Crypto Rails: Skrill and Neteller deposits were converted into a Nylo crypto-purchase-and-send flow.
- Payee and Descriptor Opacity: MiFinity showed Buscarar LLC, eps/Skrill showed Deskimopay, the card rail showed BLUETECH GBP, and Binance Pay was routed through CryptonBTC.
This is a textbook Rail Atlas case: the key risk is not only the offshore casino, but the payment infrastructure that enables the casino to reach EU consumers while obscuring the true beneficiary, payment purpose, and merchant-of-record chain.
Whistleblower Request
FinTelegram invites players, PSP employees, bank compliance officers, former Betify insiders, wallet-provider employees, crypto-payment insiders, and payment-orchestration specialists to provide information about:
Betify, Fortuna Games N.V., Deltaprime Limited, Altacore N.V., Altaprime Limited, Passpoint Sp. z o.o., Nylo, Buscarar LLC, Deskimopay, BLUETECH GBP, InstantBankPayment, Yapily Connect UAB, Revolut, Wise, MiFinity, Skrill, Neteller, Paysafe, Binance Pay, CryptonBTC, SegoPay, Axipays, and related settlement accounts or wallet addresses.
Information can be submitted confidentially via Whistle42.
