The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has opened Competition Act 1998 investigations into PayPal, Mastercard and Visa over suspected anti-competitive conduct linked to the funding and usage of PayPal’s digital wallet. This is not an AML case, not a consumer-fraud case, and not yet a finding of wrongdoing. It is something potentially more structural.
FinTelegram’s Rail Atlas review of 1Go Casino identified CAPITOLIO INC. as the visible payee in a Revolut/Yapily open-banking casino deposit flow. Capitolio presents itself as a Canadian MSB offering open-banking, fiat-to-crypto, payout, and gaming/digital-economy infrastructure — raising urgent questions about its role as a collection entity for offshore casino payments.
FinTelegram’s latest Revolut Rail Atlas review of 1Go Casino shows how a player-facing offshore casino cashier can route deposits through a multi-layered payment stack before reaching a regulated open-banking interface. In the tested Revolut flow, the user journey moved from 1Go Casino through BillBlend, SegoPay, Tryzto, InstantBankPayment, Yapily Connect UAB, and finally oba.revolut.com, where the user was asked to authorise Yapily Connect UAB.
FinTelegram’s ongoing Rail Atlas investigation has identified a recurring pattern behind offshore casino payments targeting EU users: anonymous gateway layers route transactions into regulated Open Banking providers—including Yapily, Perspecteev (SaltEdge ecosystem), and now Powens—before reaching bank endpoints such as Revolut.
FinTelegram’s Revolut Rail Atlas has identified another regulated Open Banking enabler inside an offshore casino cashier: Powens, a French ACPR-regulated payment institution. In a test of Luckzie Casino, Revolut appeared as a prominent payment option alongside cards and crypto. The observed flow moved from Luckzie to supergateway.net, then to PayOp, then to Powens, and finally to Revolut’s Open Banking API at oba.revolut.com.
FinTelegram’s Rail Atlas investigation into casino payment flows has taken a new turn. What began with alleged threats against a player has evolved into a pattern: intimidation, followed by silence, and accompanied by public mockery. With no response to formal inquiries but sarcastic engagement on LinkedIn, Impaya’s handling of the situation raises serious questions about compliance culture, accountability, and its role in high-risk payment infrastructures.
Instead of answering serious compliance questions, Impaya’s CEO Sergejs Roslikovs responded to FinTelegram’s investigation with sarcasm on LinkedIn — “Thanks for the advertisement :)”. His COO joined the tone, celebrating the attention. Meanwhile, Impaya has not answered FinTelegram’s formal inquiry.
As FinTelegram expands its Rail Atlas investigation into offshore casino payment flows, a new element has emerged: alleged threats by Impaya against a player who raised compliance concerns. Screenshots and video evidence reviewed by FinTelegram show aggressive language, legal threats, and mockery — including emojis — instead of a structured response.
FinTelegram has reviewed a whistleblower report indicating that Germany’s financial watchdog BaFin has registered a case concerning Yapily Connect UAB, the Lithuanian licensed arm of the UK open-banking group Yapily. The allegations are explosive: regulated Pay by Bank infrastructure was allegedly used to process deposits for offshore casino brands targeting German players.
Illegal casino networks are no longer just websites. They are hidden routing systems that adapt domains, bonus offers and payment options to a player’s location, device and behaviour. FinTelegram explains how mirror domains, affiliate funnels, geo-routing engines and payment agents help offshore gambling networks bypass website blocks, gambling controls and banking transparency — while players see only a polished casino front end.
FinTelegram’s review of GoldenBet shows a diversified payment architecture around the Santeda Group: card deposits evidenced through Payabl, wallet deposits showing Santeda International Limited as beneficiary via MiFinity, and an Open Banking rail through Bilderlings → Yapily Connect → Revolut’s Open Banking API. This is no longer a single-PSP complaint story. It is a Rail Atlas case study in how offshore casino operators maintain EU-facing payment continuity
Whistleblower evidence reviewed by FinTelegram indicates that casino deposits may pass through a layered redirect chain before reaching the Paysolo open-banking gateway. The observed flow — Pagagate → Impaya.online → Aceiro.online → openbanking.paysolo.net — suggests that Impaya and Aceiro may function as intermediate routing or masking layers between casino-facing payment gateways and the open-banking execution stack involving Paysolo, Pellopay, Yapily and Revolut.